Security researchers have discovered three attacks, collectively called 'Pass-ta-key,' that target Google Password Manager in Chrome on Windows devices equipped with a Trusted Platform Module (TPM).
Pass-ta-key attacks
These attacks allow malware on already-compromised Windows devices to abuse Google Password Manager's synced passkeys to take over accounts, bypass user verification, and extract passkey private keys. Passkeys are a passwordless authentication method that uses cryptographic keys stored on a user's device to sign in to online accounts.
First technique: Pass-ta-key
The first technique, named Pass-ta-key, allows unprivileged malware to impersonate a trusted device and request a valid authentication response for one of the victim's passkeys. The malware abuses Chrome's TPM-backed device identity key to sign a request sent to Google's cloud authenticator.
This can be done without administrator privileges, user interaction, biometrics, or unlocking the device. Google's cloud authenticator then treats the request as coming from the victim's trusted computer and returns a signed authentication response, known as an assertion, that can be used to log in to the targeted account.
Second technique: Silver Pass-ta-key
The second technique, named Silver Pass-ta-key, goes further by allowing attackers to register their own user-verification key with Google's cloud authenticator. The attacker first uses malware on the compromised device to force Chrome to re-register it by invalidating its existing verification key or deleting the local file containing its passkey state.
During the re-registration process, the attacker can register a user-verification key they control because the cloud authenticator does not validate whether the new key originated from trusted hardware. Google then accepts requests signed with the attacker's key as proof that the victim unlocked the device using a PIN or biometrics.
Third technique: Golden Pass-ta-key
The third and most severe technique, named Golden Pass-ta-key, allows malware to obtain the master key used to encrypt all passkeys synced through the victim's Google Password Manager account. This master key, known as the security domain secret, is temporarily sent to Chrome when a device registers or recovers access to the account.
Unit 42 initially found that Chrome exposed the secret in plaintext through its internal FIDO logs. Google removed the secret from the logs after the researchers reported the issue, but Unit 42 says it is still sent to Chrome and remains temporarily accessible in the browser's process memory.
The attacker can then use the stolen master key to decrypt the victim's synced passkey records and recover their private keys. Those private keys can be transferred to another system and used to impersonate the victim and sign in to their accounts.
Unit 42 warns that the stolen master key could also be used to decrypt future passkeys synced to the account. Google's current implementation reportedly provides no way to rotate or revoke the key, meaning current and future synced passkeys remain protected by the same secret.
Recommendations
Unit 42 recommends that websites require and properly validate user verification. Credential managers should also validate newly registered device keys, harden recovery and device re-registration processes, and prevent master keys from becoming accessible in browser memory.
The researchers disclosed the Google Password Manager attacks to Google and reported related user-verification flaws to affected services, including eBay, before publishing their findings.
Source: BleepingComputer